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Abstract 
Recent many empirical studies have argued that currency carry trade have been a 
driving force behind exchange rate movements, and have explained the latest financial 
crisis of 2007-2009 in terms of a sudden, massive reversal of carry trade positions.  
The aim of this paper is to provide one potential theoretical explanation for 
questions why currency carry trade becomes profitable, and why a sudden 
unwinding of carry trade is caused. We propose a new behavioral model of currency 
bubbles and crashes. We consider that investors trade two currencies: the domestic 
currency, and the foreign currency. Investors are divided into two groups, the rational 
investors and the carry traders. The rational investors maximize their expected 
utility of their wealth in the next period. Carry traders maximize their random 
utility of binary choice: investing the domestic currency or investing the foreign 
currency.   
We demonstrate that carry-traders’ herd behavior, which follows the 
behavior getting a majority, gives cause to a currency bubble, and their carry 
trading prolongs bubble. However, depreciation of funding currency slows down as 
the carry-trader’s behavior approaches to a stationary state, so that the return on 
carry trade predicted by carry traders begins to decrease in the second half of 
bubble. We demonstrate that decreasing the return on carry trade predicted by 
carry traders lead to currency crash. Our model also gives a plausible explanation on 
the forward premium puzzle.  
 
JEL Classification Codes: F31, G01 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Many researchers have focused on the role of carry trade on currency bubble and 
the possibility that a sudden unwinding of carry trade might give cause to currency 
crisis. Recent many empirical studies have argued that currency carry trade have been 
a driving force behind exchange rate movements in the latest financial crisis of 
2007-2009 and have explained the large currency crashes in terms of a sudden, massive 
reversal of carry trade positions. (See for instances, Gagnon, and Chaboud (2007), 
Cairns, Ho and McCauley (2007), Galati, Heath and McGuire (2007), Brunnermeier, 
Nagel, and Pedersen (2008), Melvin and Taylor (2009), and Kohler (2010)).  
 
A carry trade is a popular strategy for currency investors which consists of selling 
low interest-rate currencies and investing in high interest-rate currency. Currency carry 
trade is profitable if the interest differential is not completely offset by an appreciation 
of the low interest-rate currency. An increase in carry trade positions generally tends to 
weaken the low interest-rate currencies and strengthen the high interest-rate 
currencies. This makes profitability self-fulfilling and attracting further carry trades. 
As a result of this feedback loop, carry trades tend to be associated with a gradual 
appreciation of the high interest-rate currency and a depreciation of the low 
interest-rate currency for a while. However, as some reasons such as changes in interest 
rate expectations lead carry traders to a sudden unwinding of carry trades, there is a 
tendency for the high interest-rate currencies to depreciate and the low interest-rate 
currencies to appreciate sharply.  
The aim of this paper is to provide one potential theoretical explanation for 
questions how currency bubbles and crashes which describes above. We propose a new 
model of currency bubbles and crashes which are caused by carry trade. The high 
average payoffs to the carry trade means the violation of uncovered interest parity 
(UIP) which has been termed the forward premium puzzle: currencies with high 
interest rates tend to appreciate. Our model also proposes a solution for a forward 
premium puzzle1.  
 
We consider that investors trade two currencies: the domestic currency, and the 
foreign currency. Investors are divided into two groups, rational investors and carry 
traders. The rational investors chooses that the portfolio of currencies which will 
maximize his/her expected utility of end-of-period wealth using asset-pricing models 
such as the CAPM (see e.g., Mossin (1966) and Lintner (1969)). On the other hand, carry 
                                                   
1 Empirical studies consistently reject the UIP ( see, for a survey on this topic, Engel 
(1996),.  
traders maximize their random utility of alternatives2, that is, selling foreign currency 
and buying domestic currency, or selling domestic currency and buying foreign currency. 
We assume that a carry trader’s decision-making is influenced by (i) the decisions of the 
other carry-traders, and (ii) the carry traders’ anticipation of the payoffs to carry trade 
which is defined as the exponential moving average of the payoffs to carry trade. The 
carry-trader’s utility function of an alternative is composed of the above attributes, and 
random variable. In our model, we show that as the interaction among carry traders, 
that is, the extent, that each carry-trader is influenced by the decisions of other 
carry-traders, is reinforced, carry traders begin to follow the herd. In the attribute (ii), 
we also assume that the carry-traders’ expectation of the return on carry trade is 
adaptive. Our model indicates a mechanism that that carry-traders’ herd behavior, 
which follows the behavior getting a majority, and their attempt to surf currency 
bubbles, gives cause to a bubble ended up with a crash. This also gives a plausible 
explanation on the forward premium puzzle.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The model is described in Section 2. In Section 3, and 
in Section 4 we give a theoretical explanation on a mechanism of currency bubble and 
crash. We give concluding remarks in Section 5.  
 
2. Model  
 
Consider the exchange market in which two currencies are traded. tS  denotes the spot 
                                                   
2 The qualitative choice models based on maximization of the agent’s random utility has been developed 
by McFadden (1974) .  
exchange rate defined as unit of foreign currency per domestic currency. The variables 
tB  and *tB  denote holdings of foreign currency and domestic currency at time t , 
respectively. Currencies are purchased at time t  yield interest rates of tR  in foreign 
currency and *tR  in domestic currency, respectively. We divide into two groups of 
investors with different decision making. The first group of investors is a group of 
rational investors who maximize their expected utility of wealth in the next period 
using asset-pricing models such as the CAPM (see e.g., Mossin (1966) and Lintner 
(1969)). The second group of investors is the group of the carry traders who maximize 
the random utility3 of the binary choice: investing in a long position in the domestic 
currency financed by borrowing in the foreign currency, and investing in a long position 
in the domestic currency financed by borrowing in the foreign currency.  
 
2.1 Rational investors 
 
Let us consider the behavior of rational-investors. We shall assume that there is a 
number M of rational investors. Their object is to maximize the expected utility 
1( )tEU W + of wealth 1+tW  in the next period, t+1 by selecting a portfolio mix of the 
domestic currency *tB  and the foreign currency tB . We assume that rational investor’s 
preferences are characterized by the constant-absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility 
with the coefficient of risk aversion, g . The rational investors are assumed to be 
identical. We consider the behavior of the representative-rational investor hereafter. 
The maximization problem which the rational investors solve is equivalent to the 
                                                   
3 See McFadden (1974).  
mean-variance model4. That is, in his choice among all the possible portfolios, the 
rational investor is satisfied to be guided by its expected yields ( )tE W and its variance 
( )tV W .  
* 1,
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4  The Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion is defined as '' / 'itU W Ur º - , where 
( )U W is the utility function, the expectation of which is to be maximized. One can take a 
Tayler-series approximation to ( )EU W and differentiate it with respect to ( )E W and 
( )V W to show that the two definitions of r are equivalent.  
The utility function will have a constant coefficient of relative risk-aversion if it is 
exponential in form:  
1( ) ,U W W gg=  
where 1r g= - . The solution to the one-period maximization problem considered here will 
be the correct solution to the general intertemporal maximization problem,  
if the utility function is further restricted to the logarithmic form, the limiting case as 
g goes to zero, which implies 1r = , or if events occurring during the period are 
independent of the expected returns that prevail in the following period.  
 
where 1( )tE S + is the expected value of 1tS + , 2js the variance of 1tS + .  
The corresponding first-order conditions are:   
      * 2 * * 2 *1* (1 ) ( ) [2 (1 ) ] 02t t t t tt
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where m denotes the Lagrangian. Holdings of domestic and foreign currencies of the 
optimal portfolio are:  
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The well-known uncovered interest-rate parity (UCIP) is written as  
* 1( )(1 ) (1 ) tt t
t
E SR R S
+æ ö+ = + ç ÷è ø .                               (4) 
Using the UCIP (4), the equation (3) can be rewritten as follows:  
* * 1
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Therefore, the rational investors’ transaction depends on the expected risk premiums of 
risky assets.  The excess demand (or excess supply) for two currencies by rational 
investors is calculated by subtracting tS from 1tS +  
* * 1
1 1 12 * * 2 * *
1 1
(1 ) (1 )1 1( ) ( )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
t t
t t t t t t
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2.2. Carry traders 
 
Let us assume that there is a large number N of carry traders. Each carry trader is 
assumed to decide the funding currency and investment currency for each period. That 
is, each of them is selling the foreign currency and buying the domestic currency or 
selling the domestic currency and buying the foreign currency. We consider that the 
individual carry trader maximizes his/her random utility of the alternatives. That is, 
he/she chooses an alternative with the highest utility5. The carry-trader’s random 
utility function is composed of the deterministic part which is assumed to represent 
average behavior, and a nondeterministic part to represent random deviations from this 
average. The random utility of alternatives is given as:  
U U
U U
e
e
+ + +
- - -
ì = +ïí = +ïî
                             (7) 
where ie  is a random variable. The carry trader attaches a value, iU  to each of two 
alternatives, that is, investing in domestic currency financed by selling in the foreign 
currency (labeled +), and investing in foreign currency financed by selling in the 
domestic currency (labeled－).  
                                                   
5 The random utility function of discrete choice developed by McFadden (1974) who has developed 
qualitative choice models based on maximization of the agent’s random utility. 
A common procedure used in both economics and finance is to assume the existence 
of a “representative” or “average” individual who is assumed to have tastes equal to the 
average over all decision makers. Two possible explanations for the stochastic term are 
given by Hausman and Wise (1978). The first is that a carry trader behaves randomly, 
perhaps due to random firing of neurons; so that faced repeatedly with the same 
alternative set. The same individual makes different choices. Second is that there are 
unobserved characteristics of the individual and unobserved attributes of the 
alternatives. Given the specification of the utility function, each carry trader is assumed 
to choose the alternative that maximizes his utility. The maximization of the random 
utility gives the probability with which each alternative is chosen. The probability that 
he chooses each alternative is given as :  
Pr[ ] Pr[ ]
Pr[ ] Pr[ ]
P U U U U
P U U U U
e e
e e
+ + - + - - +
- - + - + + -
ì = > = - ³ -ïí = > = - ³ -ïî
                          (8) 
where 1P P+ -+ = .  
We assume that individual carry trader’s decision-making is influenced by (i) the other 
carry-traders and (ii) the return on carry trade tH anticipated by the carry trader. To 
describe a carry-trader’s utility function which is composed of those determinants, let us 
introduce a new variable te  that denotes the normalized excess of the carry traders 
who sell the foreign currency and buy the domestic currency over the carry traders who 
sell the domestic currency and buy the foreign currency which is defined as 
( ) /t t te n n N+ -= -  where tn+  is the number of carry traders who sell the foreign 
currency and buy the domestic currency, and tn-  is the number of carry traders who 
sell the domestic currency and buy the foreign currency in the period t. 
Obviously t tn n N+ -+ º . Using the variable te , we rewrite the equation (8),  
( )
t t
t t
U e H
U e H
l
l
+
-
ì = +ïí = - +ïî
                                            (9) 
where the parameter l is assumed to be positive and constant. Givenl is a positive, an 
increase in te raises the utility of selling the foreign currency and buying the domestic 
currency, and reduces the utility of selling the domestic currency and buying foreign 
currency in the direction of the minority decision. This means that the carry trader has 
a tendency to be in favor of the majority decision. tH denotes the excess return on carry 
trade expected by carry traders which is defined as,  
*
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where the parameterq  is constant( 0 1q< < ). The carry traders’ anticipation tY of the 
relative change of the exchange rate tS  is described as the exponential moving average 
of the past relative change tsD  of the exchange rate. tY  is equivalent to  
1 1 0 0(1 ) ,t t t tY Y s H Hq q- - == - + D =                             (11) 
where 0 1q< < . It means that the carry-trader’s expectation on the risk premium is 
adaptive.   
As the expected return tH to carry trade is higher, the utility of selling the foreign 
currency and buying the domestic currency raises, and the utility of selling the domestic 
currency and buying foreign currency is reduced.  
 
The equations (10), and (11) means that the carry traders adapt the carry strategies 
which are a strategy that buys a currency with high return and sells currencies with 
poor returns over the past periods with a high probability6.  
 
McFadden (1974) has shown that if the random variable ie are independently and 
identically distributed with the Gumbell distribution 
( ) Pr[ ] exp[ exp[ ]]iF e e e eº £ = - -                             (12) 
The probability that a utility-maximizing carry trader will choose each alternative, is 
expressed as:  
exp[ ]
exp[ ] exp[ ]
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+
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-
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ì =ï +ïíï =ï +î
                                     (13) 
Now we introduce a variable n which is the probability that a transition is attempted 
by one of the carry-traders, and follows a uniform distribution over carry-traders. We 
assume that one carry-trader attempts a trade in one time unit. The individual 
transition probabilities per an unit time period is described as  
exp[ ( )]( ) exp[ ] exp[ ( )]
exp[ ]( ) exp[ ] exp[ ( )]
t t
t
t t t t
t t
t
t t t t
e Hp e e H e H
e Hp e e H e H
ln l l
ln l l
¯
­
- +ì = ×ï + + - +ïí +ï = ×ï + + - +î
                    (14) 
The random variable n  determines the time scale in which a transition which is 
attempted by a carry trader occurs.  
( )tp e¯ is the transition probability that one of the carry traders who sell the foreign 
currency and buy the domestic currency. Inversely ( )tp e­  the transition probability 
that one of the carry traders who sell the domestic currency and buy the foreign 
                                                   
6 The fact that momentum strategies yield significant profits, have been well investigated.  Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) examine a variety of momentum strategies and document that strategies earn profits.  
currency.   
The effects of l and tH on the transition probabilities can be described as follows: 
 
i) A positivel enlarges the transition probability in favor of the majority choice 
and reduces the transition probability in the direction of the minority choice. 
This positive feedback effect grows for a growing imbalance of choices. 
ii) A positive expected return on carry trade tH increases the probability that a 
carry trader changes the investment currency from the foreign currency to the 
domestic currency, and reduces the probability of changing the investment 
currency from the domestic currency to the foreign currency, and vice versa for 
negative tH .  
 
Using the transition probabilities, the equation for the distribution ( )tp s of stochastic 
process of s is described by  
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where / 2e ND = . 
The equation (15) is called as the master equation (See Gardiner (1985)). When the 
number of carry traders is large, the equation (15) is equivalent to the dynamic equation 
of the mean tX of ( )tp e  (see Weidlich and Haag (1983)),  
 
1 1 [ tanh( ) ]t t t t t tX X X X H Xn l+ +D º - = + -                            (17) 
where ( ) /t t tX n n N
+ -= - . tn
+ denotes the number of carry traders who the carry 
traders who sell the foreign currency and buy the domestic currency at the period t, and 
tn
-  denotes the number of carry traders who sell the domestic currency and buy the 
foreign currency at the period t. The solution of (17) corresponds to the maximum of the 
stationary distribution ( )st tp e  of the master equation (15), and the equation of (17) 
describes the collective behavior of the representative carry-trader.  
Using the difference of tˆs from period t to period t+1, the aggregate excess demand 
for the domestic currency by all carry traders is defined as  
 
( )11 2 t tt t
QNQ n n X X+ + --é ù- = -ë û                                    (18) 
 
where Q denotes the amount of the domestic currency which is exchanged in any 
transaction by a carry trader, and is assumed to be constant. The equation (18) will be 
utilized when the market exchange rates are calculated under the market clearing 
conditions in section 2.4.  
 
2.3. Collective behavior of the representative carry traders 
 
Before we discuss about currency bubble and crash, we describe the collective 
behavior of the representative carry traders using equation (17).  As the above 
conditions i) and ii) indicate, the carry trader’s transition probability depends on the 
variables l and tH . For convenience of analysis, let us assume that the return on carry 
trade tH is a parameterH . The solutions of the mean equation (17) can be summarized 
with respect to l andH  as follows:  
 
i) The case of 10 << l  and arbitraryH :  
There is only one possible solution **X . The solution corresponds to the 
maximum of the stationary distribution ( )st tp e . For 0tH = and 10 << l , the 
only one possible solution is zero.  
Although in this case which the relatively small value of l  which indicates 
the strength of interaction among carry traders, the driving force of the 
collective behavior of carry traders mainly the expected return on carry trade 
H , a strong herding among carry traders dose not function. In Figure 1 the 
graphical solution to (17) is plotted for 1l < and the different values of H .  
When the expected return on carry tradeH is positive (negative), the solution 
moves from zero to a positive value (a negative value).  
 
ii) The case of 1>l  and H H< : 
H is determined by the equation lll =-- ])1([cosh2 H . There are three 
possible solutions * ** ***X X X< < .  The solution *X and ***X are called the 
bear-market equilibrium and the bull-market equilibrium respectively. 
Therefore, as the interaction among carry traders l increases, the 
solution **X is unstable, and appears the bear-market equilibrium *( 0)X < and 
bull-market equilibrium ***( 0)X > . As l exceeds unity, the stationary 
distribution ( )st tp e  is from unimodal to multimodal. This bifurcation is called 
as the second-order phase transition. In Figure 2 the graphical solution to (17) 
is plotted for 1l > . 
 
iii) The case of 1>l and H H= :  
 Two of the tree solutions * ** ***X X X< < coincide at ( 1) /cX l l= ± - .  
An increase (a decrease) in the expected return on carry trade H  causes the 
curve which indicates the transcendental equation (17) to shift up (down), so 
that the solutions rise (fall). Figure 3 shows the states that two of the tree 
solutions coincide.  
 
iv) There case of 1>l  and H H> :  
There is one solution again. When 1>l , andH  is negative and decreasing 
continuously, the stationary distribution ( )st tp e  is from multimodal to unimodal. 
The solution jumps down from ***X to *X  at the moment that the expected 
return on carry trade H  falls below ( H- ). Inversely, the solution jumps up 
from *X to ***X at the moment that or that the expected return on carry 
trade H  exceeds ( H+ ). This bifurcation is called as the first-order phase 
transition.  
 
2.4. Market-clearing exchange rates  
 
The market clearing condition requires that the aggregated excess demand 
(supply) for each currency by rational investors is equal to the aggregated excess 
demand (supply) by currency traders from the period t-1 to the period t. That is, if one 
carry-trader changes from an investment in the foreign currency to an investment in 
the domestic currency, then the exchange rate tS  is adjusted such that rational 
investors supply the corresponding domestic currency and demand the corresponding 
foreign currency. That is,  
* *
1 1( ) ( )2t t t t
QNM B B X X- -- = - .                                   (19) 
For simplicity of analysis we assume that the interest rate of each currency is fixed over 
time. Then from equation (6) the aggregated excess demands for currency by rational 
investors are obtained by multiplying the number M  of rational investors:  
( ) ( )* * 1 1 12 * *(1 )( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) (1 )t t t t t t
M RM B B E S E S S SR Rgs- + -
ì ü+- = - - -í ý+ +î þ
         (20) 
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1 1( ) (1 ) ( (1 ) )t t t t tM B B M R S B R B- -- = + - +                               (21) 
Then, the market clearing conditions are described as  
( ) ( )
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Solving the equations (19) with respect to changes on the exchange rate 
1( )t t tS S S -D = -  we can obtain changes on the exchange rate which satisfy the 
market-clearing conditions. In summary, the dynamics of exchange rate can be 
described as:  
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
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We assume that the term 1( )tE S + , which describes the fundamental value of the 
exchange rate which is renewed by the fundamental news in the period t. The terms are 
often considered as a random variable which fluctuates. To demonstrate the occurrence 
of currency crisis without the fundamental news, we assume the term 1( )tE S +  are 
constant over time, that is, 1( ) ( ) 0t tE S E S+ - = . Then, the changes of the exchange rate 
1( )t t tS S S -D º - depend completely on the carry traders’ excess demand for the domestic 
currency, 1( ) / 2t tQN X X -- . Since 0a > , the change tSD increases (decreases) 
proportionally with respect to the carry traders’ excess demand for the domestic 
currency, 1( ) / 2t tQN X X -- .  
 
3. Currency bubble caused by carry trade 
 
As discussed in subsection 2.3., when the parameterl , which indicates the degree of 
intensity of the interaction among carry traders, exceeds unity, the unique 
solution **( 0)X =  is unstable, and appears newly two solutions, the bear-market 
solution *( 0)X < and bull-market solution ***( 0)X >  both of which are stable, under 
0tH = . This gives cause to the carry traders’ herd behavior. Let us consider the motion 
of the exchange rate starting from the unstable solution **( 0)X = . Depending on the 
value of 0X  at the initial time 0t = , the exchange rate tS  can either enter a bull 
market or a bear market. That is, when the initial value of 0X  is positive (negative), 
the exchange rate tS  raises, and enter a bubble phase (non-bubble phase).  
We now assume that the interest rate *R of the domestic currency is greater than the 
interest rate R of the foreign currency. That is, the interest rate differential is  
positive, *( ) 0R R- > . This positively raises the expected return on carry trade tH . 
Then, the appreciation of the domestic currency against the foreign currency is due to 
increases in the carry-traders’ excess demand 1( ( ) / 2)t tQN X X -- for domestic currency, 
and the aggregate demand for the domestic currency – investment currency - by 
carry-traders is increased further due to the carry traders’ herding, and it raises further 
the expected return on carry trade tH . The increases in the expected return tH  and 
the carry traders’ herd behavior next pull up toward the bull-market solution ***( 0)X > . 
As the carry-traders’ excess demand for the domestic currency is increased, the domestic 
currency against the foreign currency appreciates, (that is, the exchange rate tS  rises), 
and is over-evaluated. This inflationary spiral gives cause to the currency bubble.  
For 1>l and tH H>  the bear-market equilibrium disappears, and the bull-market 
equilibrium is unique and stable. Thus, the currency bubble persists until the 
imbalance of buyers and sellers over the carry traders, te  approaches to the 
bull-market equilibrium ***( 0)X > .  
 
3.1 Forward Premium Puzzle  
 
In the period of bubbles, the actual high return on the investment currency is earned as 
the result of low expected future returns. That is, rational investors sell the domestic 
currency because they believe that the carry gains due to the interest-rate differential 
are offset by a commensurate depreciation of the investment currency. In the opposite 
direction, more carry traders buy the domestic currency more. The change tSD on the 
exchange rate is contrary to the rational investors’ expectation in the period of bubbles. 
As a result, the carry traders get a capital gain from the appreciation of the exchange 
rate tS  in the period of bubbles.  
 
Uncovered interest parity (UIP) predicts that if the low interest rate currency 
were to appreciate relative to the high interest rate, then any gain on the interest rate 
differential from the carry trade will be exactly offset by the capital loss resulting from 
the exchange rate movement, leaving the carry trader no better. However, uncovered 
interest parity has been studied by many researchers in international economics, and 
has been widely rejected. High-interest-rate currencies tend to appreciate relative to 
low-interest-rate currencies. This violation of the UIP is often referred to as the forward 
premium puzzle. In our model, the carry traders’ belief in the success of carry trades can 
thus become self-fulfilling, and the failure of uncovered interest parity becomes the 
consequence of carry trades in the period of currency bubble. Thus, our model gives a 
persuasive explanation on the forward premium puzzle.  
 
4. Currency crash caused by unwinding of carry trade  
 
In the first half of bubbles, the carry-traders’ excess demand for the investment 
currency is sharply increasing, so that the exchange rate tS  is also sharply appreciating, 
but in the second half of bubbles, as the carry-traders’ imbalance tX  is approaching the 
bull market equilibrium ***X , the carry-traders’ excess demand 1( ) / 2t tQN X X --  for 
the investment currency is approaching zero, and so a rise in the exchange rate slows 
down.  
 
Decreasing the expected return on carry trade tH changes the bull-market 
equilibrium ***X  downward, so that the carry traders’ excess demand 
1( ) / 2t tQN X X --  for the investment currency declines, and the exchange rate tS  
starts to decrease.  As the expected return on carry trade tH decreases, the 
bear-market equilibrium *X appears again. This deflationary spiral continues to 
decrease and tH becomes negative in its final stage of bubbles even if the interest rate 
differential *( )R R-  is positive. A sudden currency crash moves unrelated to 
fundamental news can be due to the unwinding of carry trades. In the end stage of 
bubbles the expected return tH declines until tH H= - . In an instant when tH falls 
below H- , the probability of the carry trader’s selling the domestic currency is higher 
than the probability of the carry trader’s buying the domestic currency and a large-scale 
unwinding of carry trade is caused. In our model the currency crash is considered as the 
so called first-order phase transition. See Figure 4. The carry traders’ selling on 
domestic currency in the period of a crash depends on the parameter l .  
After a crash, the rational investors buy the domestic currency, which they sell in the 
period of bubbles, back when they predict the appreciation of the domestic currency 
from UIP. After all, the rational investors can make a profit from a long-term 
investment, while the carry traders lose money.   
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
 
This paper provides one potential theoretical explanation for currency bubble and crash. 
A merit of this paper is to propose that a model describing the rationality of the carry 
trader’s behavior, and a mechanism of currency bubble and crash which is caused by the 
carry trader’s behavior. This also shed new light on the forward premium puzzle.  
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      Figure 1: The solutions of the equation (17) for 1l < and the three values ofH .  
    The straight line is 45 degree line.  
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 Figure 2: The solutions of the equation (17) for 1l > and 0H = . The straight line 
is 45 degree line.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The solutions of the equation (17) for 1l > and H H= ± . The straight 
line is 45 degree line.  
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Figure 4: The dynamics of (20) for 1l > and 1( ) 0jtE p +D = . Bubble and Crash.  
 
